In an economy with identical infinitely-lived households that obtain utility from leisure as well as consumption, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that the optimal tax system to pay for an exogenous stream of government purchases involves a zero tax rate on capital in the long run. Tax revenue is collected by a distortionary tax on labor income. Extending the results of Hall and Jorgenson (1971) to general equilibrium, I show that if purchasers of capital are permitted to deduct capital expenditures from taxable capital income, then a constant tax rate on capital income is non-distortionary. Even though this specification of the capital income tax imposes a zero effective tax rate on capital, the capital income tax can collect substantial revenue. Provided that government purchases are not too large, the optimal tax system will consist of a positive tax rate on capital income and a zero tax rate on labor income-just the opposite of the results of Chamley and Judd. Moreover, I show that the utility of the representative consumer is higher with the tax system I examine here than under the Chamley-Judd policy. * I thank Joao Gomes and Stavros Panageas for helpful discussion.
The optimal way for a government to collect revenue to pay for its purchases of goods and services is to levy lump-sum taxes. However, lump-sum taxes generally are not available, so some form of economic activity, such as labor income, capital income, cigarette purchases, etc., must be taxed. Because the taxation of economic activities is distortionary, a basic problem of public finance is how to use such taxes to collect revenue in the least distortionary way. A classic problem of this sort analyzes the optimal use of taxes on labor income and capital income to finance an exogenous stream of government purchases in a Ramsey framework with a representative infinitely-lived household. The celebrated result of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) is that in the long run, the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero.
The Chamley-Judd result might be particularly puzzling to readers of an older literature on the conditions for the neutrality of capital income taxation. The older literature focused on the capital investment decision of a single firm, and did not embed the firm in a general equilibrium model. Hall and Jorgenson (1971) showed that for a firm that cannot deduct its cost of financing (for example, under U.S. tax law, a firm financed entirely by equity), a tax on capital income that provides for immediate expensing of capital expenditures will be neutral with respect to capital; that is, it will have no effect on optimal capital accumulation. Tax codes generally allow firms to reduce their calculated taxable income by some amount to reflect the cost of acquiring capital. This reduction in taxable income is usually implemented through a schedule of depreciation allowances, which may or may not be accelerated relative to the economic depreciation of the capital asset. The most accelerated version of depreciation allowances is immediate expensing, which leads to tax rate neutrality, as described above. A second neutrality result applies to the case in which a firm can deduct its cost of financing, as would be the case, under U.S. tax law, for a firm financed entirely by debt. In this case, Hall and Jorgenson show, and an earlier result of Samuelson (1964) implies, that allowing firms to deduct true economic depreciation will lead to tax rate neutrality with respect to capital accumulation.
The existence of neutral forms of capital taxation, i.e., forms of capital taxation that do not affect the capital investment decision of a firm, suggests that these forms of capital taxation may provide the elusive lump-sum tax that can allow the government to finance its expenditures without distortions. To explore whether such capital income tax schemes can provide non-distortionary sources of revenue, two major questions need to be addressed. First, does the neutrality of a capital income tax scheme in the context of a single firm's decision carry over to a general equilibrium framework? Second, can a capital income tax that is neutral in general equilibrium raise a nontrivial amount of revenue? The answer to the first question is different for the two neutral tax schemes mentioned above. Specifically, for a firm that cannot deduct the cost of financing, a capital income tax system that specifies a constant tax rate and includes immediate expensing is neutral in general equilibrium as well as in the context of a single firm. However, the neutrality of allowing firms that can deduct financing costs also to deduct economic depreciation does not carry over to general equilibrium. Therefore, I will focus most attention on the case with immediate expensing. I will show that for immediate expensing the answer to the second question is also positive: a capital income tax with immediate expensing can collect a substantial amount of revenue. Because a constant capital income tax rate with immediate expensing does not affect the optimal accumulation of capital chosen by purchasers of capital, and can collect substantial revenue, it can be used to finance government spending in a non-distortionary manner. Provided that the amount of government spending is not too large, there is no need to use distortionary labor income taxation.
The finding that a capital income tax with immediate expensing can collect a nontrivial amount of revenue in a non-distortionary manner turns the Chamley-Judd result on its head. Instead of setting the capital income tax rate equal to zero and using a distortionary labor income tax to collect revenue as in Chamley-Judd, the results in this paper indicate that the optimal configuration of taxes is to set the labor income tax rate equal to zero and to use a constant tax rate on capital income, combined with immediate expensing, to collect revenue. The optimal capital income tax scheme I present here leads to a higher level of utility of the representative household than does the Chamley-Judd prescription because the tax system presented here is non-distortionary, while Chamley-Judd requires the use of distortionary taxes.
The optimal tax scheme I present here holds in every period, not just in the long run. The zero capital tax rate prescribed by Chamley and Judd holds only in the long run. Chamley also derives the optimal tax rate on capital at every point in time for the special case in which utility is separable over time, additively separable in consumption and leisure, isoelastic in consumption, and linear in leisure. In this special case, he shows that the optimal tax rate on capital income is initially 100% and remains equal to 100% until some point in time at which it abruptly jumps to zero, and remains zero forever. However, I show that in a tax system that includes immediate expensing, the optimal tax rate is constant over time.
Because the optimal tax policy in this paper stands in sharp contrast to the celebrated zero tax rate on capital derived by Chamley and Judd for the long run, it is important to emphasize that the difference does not reflect an error in the ChamleyJudd analysis. The difference is due entirely to the treatment of capital expenditures in calculating capital income. In actual tax codes, depreciation allowances permit firms to amortize the cost of purchasing capital over time, and the present value of depreciation allowances -Hall and Jorgenson's (1967) famous "z"-is generally between zero and one. 1 Chamley has (implicitly) chosen to set z equal to zero. Judd specifies depreciation allowances equal to economic depreciation, so the implied value of z in his model is between zero and one. As mentioned earlier, in the context of a single firm that can deduct the cost of financing, economic depreciation will make the capital income tax neutral with respect to capital. However, as I demonstrate in Section 7, this result does not carry over to general equilibrium, so the capital income tax analyzed by Judd is distortionary in a general equilibrium framework. I have chosen to set z equal to one. To understand the importance of the value of z, consider the class of capital income tax schemes parametrized by a sequence of capital income tax rates, τ K t , and present values of depreciation, z t , for all t. The search for an optimal capital income tax scheme, which motivated Chamley and Judd as well as this paper, can be described as a search for the optimal sequences of τ K t and z t within this class. Chamley and Judd each chose specific constant values of z t without considering the optimal value of z t . It turns out that capital accumulation is invariant to the taxation of capital income when τ K t and z t are both constant and z t equals one. Thus, the optimal value of z t is identically equal to one, provided that the capital income tax can raise enough revenue to pay for government purchases, so that the tax rate on labor income can be zero.
The allocation that would prevail under lump-sum taxation can also be attained in a competitive economy with a constant tax rate on consumption combined with a subsidy to labor at the same rate. The constant tax rate on consumption does not distort the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. To avoid an intratemporal distortion between consumption and contemporaneous leisure, leisure must be taxed at the same rate as consumption. That is, labor supply must be subsidized. Although a consumption tax accompanied by a subsidy to labor can achieve the same allocation as a capital income tax with immediate expensing, I will focus mostly on the capital income tax because my results concerning the optimal capital income tax differ so sharply from the well-known Chamley-Judd result.
I develop a general equilibrium model with a capital income tax and immediate expensing in the first three sections of the paper. Section 1 provides a brief description of firms, which carry out production in the economy. Section 2 describes the government's purchases and its means of financing these purchases with taxes and debt. The household's decision problem is described in Section 3, which also derives a characterization of the equilibrium allocation of goods and leisure, and the evolution of rates of return. Section 4 describes the competitive equilibrium when the capital income tax is replaced by lump-sum taxes. This equilibrium represents the first-best allocation, given the exogenous path of government purchases. It serves as a benchmark to show that a capital income tax with immediate expensing will achieve the first-best equilibrium, which I do in Section 5. Then in Section 6, I calculate the amount of tax revenue that can be collected with a capital income tax that includes immediate expensing. I derive a simple expression for capital income tax revenue in a steady state, as well an expression that holds along balanced growth paths. Having focused on immediate expensing for most of the paper, I show in Section 7 that the other capital income tax scheme that is neutral in the context of a single firm-namely, economic depreciation combined with deductibility of financing costs-is not neutral in general equilibrium. Returning in Section 8 to the case in which financing costs are not deductible, I derive the effective tax rate on capital. I show that both the Chamley-Judd prescription for optimal tax policy in the long run and my prescription are characterized by a zero effective tax rate on capital. However, a zero effective tax rate on capital does not mean that capital income tax revenue is zero. Indeed, my formulation of the capital income tax can collect a potentially substantial amount of revenue, though the capital income tax collects zero revenue in the Chamley-Judd formulation. Section 9 demonstrates that a constant consumption tax rate combined with a subsidy to labor at the same rate can achieve the same allocation as can be achieved by a constant capital income tax rate with immediate expensing. It also derives the consumption tax rate that will, in a closed economy, collect the same amount of tax revenue as a given capital income tax rate, and shows that the tax rate on consumption is higher than the equivalent tax rate on capital income. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 10.
Firms
Consider a closed economy in which production is carried out by competitive firms that rent the services of capital and labor in competitive markets. Labor is supplied by a continuum of identical infinitely-lived households. I normalize the measure of households to be one. Each household works H t hours in period t. The production function is
where Y t is output, K t is the capital stock, and L t ≡ A t H t is the amount of effective hours of labor input, where A t is an index of labor-augmenting technical progress. The production function F (K t , L t ) is linearly homogeneous in K t and L t , with
The equilibrium wage rate per effective hour of labor is
Since an hour of labor by a household generates A t effective hours of labor, the wage per hour of labor is w t A t . The gross rental earned by capital in period t is
The capital stock depreciates at a constant proportional rate δ, so the evolution of capital over time is given by
where I t is gross investment in period t.
Government
The government purchases and consumes an exogenous amount of output, G t , in period t. It finances its purchases of output by levying taxes on labor income and capital income and by issuing bonds. Specifically, the government levies a tax at rate τ L t on labor income in period t and a tax at rate τ K t on capital income in period t. Most actual tax systems compute taxable capital income by deducting some allowance for the cost of purchasing capital. Here I adopt a particularly simple form of depreciation allowance. I allow purchasers of capital to immediately expense capital expenditures. Therefore, taxable capital income in period t is
Let T t be total tax revenue from taxes levied on labor income and capital income in period t. Using equation (4) to substitute K t+1 − (1 − δ) K t for gross investment in the expression for taxable capital income yields
Let B t be the value of government bonds outstanding at the beginning of period t, and let R t+1 be the gross rate of return on bonds held from period t to the beginning of period t + 1, so that
is the price in period t of a bond that is worth one unit of output at the beginning of period t + 1. Therefore, the government's budget constraint can be written as
Households
The representative household supplies labor, consumes output, holds government bonds and the economy's capital stock, and pays taxes. The household rents the capital stock to firms during period t at a rental price of r t per unit of capital, and pays taxes on capital income, net of the immediate expensing of capital expenditures. The representative household maximizes the infinite-horizon utility function
where C t is the household's consumption of goods in period t and l t is the household's leisure in period t. I assume that the household is endowed with one hour of time per period, so l t = 1 − H t . I also assume that u c > 0, u cc < 0, u l > 0, and u ll < 0. The utility function in equation (7) does not depend on the level of government purchases. Strictly speaking, this exclusion of G t from the utility function (and from the production function) means that government purchases are purely wasteful. More generally, the inclusion of G t in the utility function would have no effect on household decisions, provided that the utility function is additively separable in G t and (C t , l t ).
The budget constraint of the household is
The left hand side of the budget constraint in equation (8) contains the household's expenditure on consumption in period t, C t , the expenditure on new capital goods in period t, K t+1 − (1 − δ) K t , and the purchase of additional government bonds in period t,
− B t . The three terms on the right hand side of the budget constraint in equation (8) are, respectively, the household's after-tax wage income, ¡ 1 − τ L t ¢ w t A t H t , the household's after-tax capital income (before taking account of the expensing of investment),
, and the value of the reduction in period t taxes resulting from the deductibility of capital expenditures from taxable capital income, τ
The household chooses the sequences of consumption, C t , hours of work, H t , capital, K t+1 , and bonds, B t+1 , to maximize utility in equation (7) subject to the budget constraint in equation (8). The lagrangian for this problem is
The first-order conditions are
The next step is to eliminate the lagrange multiplier λ t from the system of four equations (10) -(13) to obtain the following three equations
Equation (14) equates the loss in utility from working an additional hour, and thus reducing leisure by an hour, in period t to the increase in utility that can be achieved by working an additional hour, earning an additional after-tax income of
A t w t , and using this income to increase consumption in period t. Equations (15) and (16) are both illustrations of the standard condition that requires the product of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the gross rate of return on an asset to be equal to one. In both equations, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is given by the term in the first set of square brackets on the left hand side. In the case of capital, the gross rate of return is the term in the second set of square brackets on the left hand side of equation (15). In the presence of immediate expensing of capital expenditures, the effective price of capital in period t is 1 − τ
The after-tax payoff in period t + 1 to a unit of capital purchased in period t is the after-tax marginal product of capital,
, plus the value of the remaining fraction 1 − δ of the unit of capital, which has an after-tax price of 1 − τ K t+1 in period t + 1. Thus, the gross rate of return on capital is the ratio of the after-tax payoff in period t + 1 accruing to capital purchased in period t to the effective purchase price of capital in period t. In the case of bonds, the gross rate of return is simply R t+1 , so equation (16) shows that the product of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the gross rate of return equals one.
Allocation with Lump-sum Taxes
If the government can levy lump-sum taxes, then it can achieve the optimal allocation by setting the tax rates on labor income and capital income equal to zero. With τ K t = τ L t = 0, the household's first-order conditions in equations (14) - (16) become
(B t+1 ) :
Equations (17) -(19) characterize the optimal allocation of C t , H t , K t+1 , and B t+1 that would prevail under lump-sum taxes.
Taxes that Satisfy Optimality Conditions
Now return to the case in which there are no lump-sum taxes. The government has available only taxes on labor income and on capital income, as described earlier.
Let τ L t = 0 for all t, and let the capital income tax rate τ K t be constant for all t. Observe that with a zero tax on labor income and a constant tax rate on capital income, with immediate expensing of capital expenditures, the household's first-order conditions in equations (14) - (16) are identical to the first-order conditions describing the optimal allocation in equations (17) - (19). This equivalence reflects the fact that with full expensing, the capital income tax is neutral, i.e., that it does not distort the optimal choice of the capital stock. Notice that the replication of the optimal allocation with a constant capital income tax rate is not just a steady-state result. It holds for arbitrary paths of labor-augmenting technical progress, A t , and arbitrary paths of government purchases, G t , provided that the capital income tax can raise sufficient revenue to pay for government purchases.
6 How Much Revenue Can be Collected by a Constant Tax Rate on Capital Income?
In this section, I will analyze the amount of revenue that can be collected by a constant tax rate on capital income with immediate expensing of capital expenditures. I will confine attention to balanced growth paths. First, I will analyze the special case with constant A t and G t , so that there is a steady state. Then I will analyze balanced growth paths with non-negative growth rates. The reason for analyzing the two cases separately is that the utility function must satisfy some additional restrictions in order for a balanced growth path with positive growth to exist. The steady state does not require additional restrictions on the utility function.
Steady State
Suppose that A t and G t are both constant and that the economy is in a steady state with constant capital, K, investment, I = δK, consumption, C, hours, H, and tax rate τ K . In this case, equation (15) implies
Taxable capital income is gross capital income, F K (K, AH) K, less investment expenditure, δK, so steady-state tax revenue, T , is
Substituting equation (20) into equation (21), and defining the rate of time preference ρ such that β = 1 1+ρ
Taxable capital income in the steady state is the product of the rate of time preference, ρ, and the capital stock, K. Because the constant tax rate τ K is not distortionary, tax revenue is proportional to τ K for 0 ≤ τ K < 1. That is, there is no Laffer curve for τ K . By setting τ K arbitrarily close to one, the government can collect capital income tax revenue that is arbitrarily close to taxable capital income, which is ρK in the steady state.
To express steady-state tax revenue as a fraction of output, multiply both sides of equation (20) by
as the capital share in income, and rearrange using the fact that ρ = β −1 − 1 to obtain
Substitute equation (23) into equation (22) to obtain
The share of taxable capital income in total income is ρ ρ+δ η. As an illustration, suppose that ρ = 0.01, δ = 0.08, and η = 0.33. In this case, taxable capital income is 3.67% of total income. In the next subsection, I will show that along a balanced growth path with a positive growth rate, the share of taxable capital income can be substantially higher.
Balanced Growth Path
In this subsection, I consider a balanced growth path in which the capital stock, consumption, and effective hours of work all grow at the same gross rate γ ≥ 1, which is the exogenous growth rate of the index of labor-augmenting technical progress, A t . Specifically,
In order for the economy to be able to attain such a balanced growth path, I assume that the utility function u (C t , l t ) has a constant elasticity with respect to C t and is multiplicatively separable in C t and l t . Specifically, (14) -(16) can be written as
(K t+1 ) :
Along a balanced growth path, A t , K t and C t all grow at gross rate γ, while the wage per effective unit of labor, w t , and hours per worker, H t , are constant. Therefore, equation (27) implies
To calculate the capital-output ratio along a balanced growth path, multiply both sides of equation (29) , and rearrange to obtain
Investment in period t is I t = K t+1 − (1 − δ) K t , and along a balanced growth path K t+1 = γK t , so
Share of Taxable Capital Income
Gross growth rate, γ 
Multiply the right hand side of equation (32) 
Applying the capital income tax rate τ K to taxable capital income in equation (33) yields the tax revenue
Note that when γ = 1, so that the balanced growth path is a steady state, equation (34) becomes identical to equation (24). Table 1 shows the share of taxable capital income in total income for various values of α, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and γ, the exogenous growth rate of A t . The calculations in this table are based on a capital income share η = 0.33, a rate of time preference ρ = 0.01, and a depreciation rate δ = 0.08. The first column of results in Table 1 shows that in a steady state, i.e., with γ = 1, taxable capital income is 3.7% of total income, as shown in subsection 6.1, regardless of the value of α. Table 1 shows that the share of taxable capital income can increase substantially with modest growth and a modest value of α. For instance, with growth of one percent per year, i.e., γ = 1.01, and α = 5, taxable capital income is 12.0% of total income, which is more than triple the value in the absence of growth. With growth of two percent per year and α = 5, taxable capital income is 16.1% of total income.
Economic Depreciation with Deductibility of Financing of Capital
Hall and Jorgenson (1971) have shown, and the results of Samuelson (1964) imply, that in the context of a single firm that takes its pre-tax cost of financing as fixed, and can deduct its cost of financing, the tax rate on capital income does not affect optimal capital accumulation if the firm is allowed to deduct economic depreciation from gross capital income when it computes taxable capital income. Thus, it might seem that economic depreciation and deductibility of financing provides another opportunity for non-distortionary taxation of capital income. However, unlike in the case of immediate expensing without deductibility of financing costs, the neutrality result for a single firm does not carry over to a general equilibrium framework. To illustrate the reason for the lack of carry over to the general equilibrium, I begin by illustrating the neutrality result for a single firm that takes the pre-tax cost of financing as fixed.
Consider an infinitely-lived firm with revenue, net of wages, f (k t ) in period t, where k t is the capital stock used by the firm in period t. Suppose that capital depreciates at rate δ per period, so that k t+1 − (1 − δ) k t is gross investment in period t. Suppose that the tax rate on capital income in period t is τ K t and that the firm is allowed to deduct economic depreciation from net revenue in computing taxable capital income. The pre-tax cost of financing is θ per period, and suppose that the firm can deduct the cost of financing so that its after-tax cost of financing in period t is
In this case, the firm chooses the path of the capital stock to maximize
where the three terms in square brackets on the right hand side are, respectively, aftertax net revenue
, the value of the tax saving due to the depreciation deduction τ K t δk t , and the cost of gross investment (k t+1 − (1 − δ) k t ) in period t. Differentiating the right hand side of equation (35) with respect to k t+1 and setting the derivative equal to zero yields
Multiplying both sides of equation (36) 
Equation (37) illustrates the invariance of the firm's optimal capital stock with respect to the capital income tax rate. For any value the capital income tax rate, τ K t , such that 0 ≤ τ K t < 1, the optimal capital stock satisfies f 0 (k t ) = δ + θ. This invariance depends importantly on the fact that the pre-tax cost of financing, θ, is invariant to the tax rate τ K t . However, in general equilibrium, the pre-tax cost of financing will not remain invariant to τ K t , as I will now show. Consider the general equilibrium model introduced in Sections 1 -3, but change the tax treatment of capital income. Specifically, suppose that instead of immediate expensing, the owners of capital are allowed to deduct an amount equal to economic depreciation δK t . With this modification of the tax treatment of capital income, the lagrangian for the household in equation (9) becomes
Differentiating the lagrangian with respect to C t , H t , K t+1 , and B t+1 , setting the derivatives equal to zero, and then reducing the system of four equations to a system of three equations by eliminating λ t yields
Recall that the optimal allocation, which can be attained with lump-sum taxes, is characterized by equations (17) To illustrate why the invariance of the capital stock with respect to τ K t in the context of a single firm does not carry over to general equilibrium, it is helpful to examine R t+1 , the gross rate of return on a government bond held from period t to period t + 1. More precisely, R t+1 is the after-tax gross rate of return. If the interest on bonds is exempt from taxation, then, of course, the after-tax and before-tax rates of return are identical. However, if the interest rate on government bonds is subject to tax at rate τ B t+1 , then R t+1 = 1 +
, where b R t+1 is the gross pre-tax rate of return on government bonds. Either way, R t+1 is the after-tax gross rate of return on government bonds. Equation (41) shows that if taxes are to leave the allocation, represented by C t , H t , and K t+1 , t = 0, 1, 2, ..., unaffected, then R t+1 must be invariant to the introduction of taxes. Thus, if, for instance, τ
will increase the pre-tax interest rate b R t+1 . However, the neutrality of the capital income tax with economic depreciation is predicated on the invariance of the pre-tax interest rate to the tax rate.
Regardless of whether interest on government bonds is taxed at the same rate as capital income, a different rate, or not at all, equations (40) and (41) imply
If the introduction of capital income taxes is to leave the allocation of K t+1 and H t+1 unaffected, then the marginal product of capital, net of depreciation, on the left hand side of equation (42) must be unaffected. However, unless R t+1 = 1, the right hand side of equation (42) depends on τ K t+1 , which would be inconsistent with the left hand side being invariant to τ K t+1 . Therefore, economic depreciation will not, in general, make the capital income tax a non-distortionary tax in general equilibrium. 
Effective Tax Rate on Capital
The taxation of capital income in actual tax codes generally depends on an array of tax parameters including the tax rate on taxable capital income, the specification of depreciation allowances used to compute taxable capital income, and possibly also an investment tax credit rate and the extent to which financing costs are deductible. The concept of the effective tax rate on capital provides a scalar measure of the degree to which all of the relevant aspects of the tax code affect a firm's optimal capital stock.
In this section, I derive the effective tax rate on capital in the special case in which there is no investment tax credit and in which financing costs are not deductible by purchasers of capital. I will then use the effective tax rate on capital in this case to show the relationship between the results of this paper and the findings of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) .
As a prelude to calculating the effective tax rate on capital, I will briefly review the calculation of z, introduced by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) . Consider a unit of capital that is purchased in period t for a price of $1, and let D (a) ≥ 0 be the depreciation allowance in period t + a when the unit of capital has age a ≥ 0. If nominal cash flows are discounted at rate i, then z = Consider a firm that pays a capital income tax at constant rate τ K on taxable income, which is calculated as gross capital income minus a specified depreciation allowance. Let M t be the present value of the stream of pre-tax marginal products of capital accruing to the undepreciated portion of a unit of capital purchased in period t. Suppose that M t is a decreasing function of the capital stock in period t. Let C t be the price of acquiring a unit of capital in period t, and let zC t be the present value of depreciation deductions over the life of the capital good. The optimal value of the capital stock in period t satisfies
where the left hand side of equation (43) is the present value of the stream of after-tax marginal products of capital accruing to the undepreciated portion of a unit of capital acquired in period t, and the right hand side of equation (43) is the cost of acquiring a unit of capital in period t, net of the present value of the depreciation tax shield associated with capital. The effective tax rate on capital, τ ET R , is the value of a tax on gross capital income, i.e., capital income without deducting any allowance for depreciation, such that the optimal capital stock is the same as implied by equation (43). Therefore, the effective tax rate satisfies
where the left hand side of equation (44) is the present value of the stream of aftertax marginal products of capital accruing to the undepreciated portion of a unit of capital acquired in period t, under a gross capital income tax at rate τ ET R , and the right hand side of equation (44) is the cost of acquiring a unit of capital in period t without any tax benefit from depreciation deductions. Notice that the value of M t in equation (44) is identical to the value of M t in equation (43) because the effective tax rate on capital is defined so that it leads to a path of capital associated with equation (44) that is identical to the path of capital associated with equation (43).
Since financing costs are not deductible, the path of discount rates associated with equation (44) is also identical to the path of discount rates associated with equation (43). Therefore, the present value of pre-tax marginal products, M t , is identical in equations (44) and (43).
To obtain an expression for the effective tax rate on capital, divide each side of equation (44) by the corresponding side of equation (43) to obtain
Equation (45) can be rearranged to obtain the following expression for the effective tax rate on capital
In the prescription for optimal tax policy that I have described in this paper, as well as in the Chamley-Judd prescription for the long run, the effective tax rate on capital is zero. However, my prescription and the Chamley-Judd prescription obtain zero effective tax rates in different ways that have fundamentally different implications for the amount of revenue collected by the optimal capital income tax. The Chamley-Judd prescription sets τ K equal to zero, which according to equation (46), achieves a zero effective tax rate on capital. However, with τ K = 0, the capital income tax does not collect any revenue, so it becomes necessary to use distortionary labor income taxation to collect revenue. My prescription for the optimal taxation of capital income, which includes immediate expensing, implies z = 1. Equation (46) shows that with z = 1 the effective tax rate on capital is zero for any nonnegative tax rate τ K less than 1. Thus, unlike the Chamley-Judd prescription, my prescription attains a zero effective tax rate on capital, while retaining the ability to collect revenue using the capital income tax, by setting τ K greater than zero. As I have shown in Section 6, a substantial amount of capital income tax revenue can be collected with this prescription. If the capital income tax can collect enough revenue to pay for government purchases, there is no need to use distortionary labor income taxation.
Consumption Tax with a Labor Subsidy
In previous sections I restricted attention to tax systems that tax labor income and capital income, allowing for depreciation allowances. If depreciation allowances take the form of immediate expensing, the capital income tax is non-distortionary, and, provided that government purchases are not too large, the distortionary labor income tax can be set to zero. This combination of taxes allows the government to finance its purchases with only non-distortionary taxes, and thus the allocation is identical to the allocation that would be achieved with lump-sum taxes. In this section, I illustrate an alternative tax system that can achieve the same allocation of consumption, leisure, and capital. This alternative system combines a consumption tax, levied at a constant rate over time, with a subsidy to labor. A consumption tax levied at a constant rate over time does not distort intertemporal margins, so it would not distort capital accumulation. If labor supply were perfectly inelastic, i.e., if leisure were not in the utility function, a constant consumption tax rate would not affect the equilibrium allocation. However, when utility depends on leisure, a consumption tax effectively subsidizes leisure. To counteract this effect, leisure must also be taxed, which effectively subsidizes labor, to replicate the allocation with lump-sum taxes.
To examine the effects of a consumption tax combined with a labor subsidy, I modify the model presented in Sections 1 -3 by eliminating the capital income tax and replacing it with a tax on consumption. Specifically, letting τ C t > −1 be the tax rate on consumption in period t, 3 total tax revenue in period t is
With the capital income tax replaced by a consumption tax, the budget constraint of the household in equation (8) is modified to
so the lagrangian for the household's problem is
Differentiating the lagrangian with respect to C t , H t , K t+1 , and B t+1 , setting the derivatives equal to zero, and then reducing the system of four first-order conditions to a system of three equations by eliminating λ t yields (H t ) :
If the consumption tax rate is constant over time, the ratio
in equations (51) and (52) equals one, so these equations are identical to equations (18) and (19), respectively, for an economy with lump-sum taxation. However, a consumption tax alone will not fully reproduce the allocation in an economy with lump-sum taxes because the consumption tax distorts the labor-leisure choice, as is evident in equation (50). If labor income is subsidized to the same extent that consumption is taxed, specifically, if τ (50) equals one, and this equation is identical to equation (17) for the economy with lump-sum taxes. Therefore, the allocation that would prevail under lump-sum taxes can be achieved by taxing consumption at a constant rate τ C while subsidizing labor with a negative labor income tax rate
To calculate the amount of tax revenue that can be collected with τ L = −τ C , substitute Y t − I t − G t for C t (since the economy is a closed economy) in equation (47), and use τ L = −τ C to obtain
Use the facts that
, to rewrite equation (53) as
The term in square brackets on the right hand side of equation (54) equals capital income net of investment expenditure, K t F K (K t , A t H t )−I t , (which is taxable capital income under an optimal capital income tax system), less government purchases, G t .
Thus, to collect a given amount of tax revenue in any period in which G t > 0, a consumption tax would need to levy a tax rate, τ C , that is higher than the capital income tax rate τ K that would lead to the same allocation, even though (as in the United States), consumption can be far larger than capital income net of investment expenditure. The reason that τ C > τ K is that in order for the consumption tax system to be optimal it must include a subsidy to labor income, which essentially gives back much of the revenue collected by the tax on consumption.
To derive the relation between the value of τ C in an optimal consumption tax system and the value of τ K in an optimal capital income tax system that would collect the same amount of revenue, I will now focus on balanced growth paths for which T t = G t > 0. 4 Setting T t = G t in equation (54) and rearranging yields
The level of taxes along a balanced growth path can be calculated by substituting net capital income from equation (33) into equation (55) to obtain
Alternatively, the same amount of tax revenue can be collected by taxing capital income, net of investment expenditure, at rate τ K = τ C 1+τ C . Thus, a consumption tax at rate τ C , combined with a labor subsidy at rate τ C , will produce the same allocation and collect the same amount of revenue as a tax on capital income, net of investment expenditure, at rate τ K where
Equation (57) indicates that the amount by which τ C exceeds τ K can be substantial.
For instance, if τ k = 50%, then an optimal consumption tax system would have to set τ C = 100% to collect the same amount of revenue.
Concluding Remarks
A classic problem in public finance is to determine how the government can collect revenue in the least distortionary way possible, given that lump-sum taxes are not available. In a general equilibrium Ramsey framework with infinitely-lived households, Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) have shown that in the long run it is optimal for the tax rate on capital to be zero. In their analyses, the government would collect tax revenue in the long run by taxing labor income. In this paper, I have re-examined the conditions, previously derived without general equilibrium considerations, under which the tax rate on capital income does not affect the optimal capital stock of a firm. The possibility that a capital income tax can be levied in a way that does not affect the capital investment decision is tantalizing because it may provide the government with a non-distortionary means to collect revenue. To examine this possibility, I addressed two questions. First, does the invariance of the capital investment choice to the tax rate on capital, under appropriate assumptions about the deductibility of capital expenditures, carry over to a general equilibrium framework? Second, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, can a capital income tax that is non-distortionary collect a substantial amount of revenue? I have shown that if purchasers of capital are permitted to immediately expense capital expenditures, then in a Ramsey framework with a representative infinitelylived household, the accumulation of capital is invariant to a tax rate on capital income that is constant over time. That is, a constant capital income tax rate with immediate expensing is a non-distortionary tax in general equilibrium, as well as in the context of a single firm. Interestingly, economic depreciation leads to the invariance of capital accumulation to the tax rate on capital in the context of a single firm facing a fixed pre-tax cost of financing and allowed to deduct the cost the financing; but this invariance does not carry over to general equilibrium.
Since the answer to the first question is affirmative for the case of immediate expensing, I then addressed the second question for the case of immediate expensing. Taxable capital income with immediate expensing is equal to capital income (revenue less wages) minus investment expenditures. Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser (1989) have shown that in a dynamically efficient economy, capital income is larger than investment, which implies that, even with immediate expensing, there is a positive amount of capital income to be taxed. Since capital accumulation is unaffected by the level of the constant tax rate on capital income, provided there is immediate expensing, there is no "Laffer curve" for the capital income tax rate. That is, the amount of tax revenue collected from the capital income tax is proportional to the tax rate. The amount of revenue that can be collected is arbitrarily close to the amount of taxable capital income in the economy. I derive expressions for the share of taxable capital income in total income, both in a steady state and along a balanced growth both. Illustrative calculations suggest that this amount could be substantial. If one looks at U.S. data to judge the size of taxable capital income with immediate expensing, one could start with gross capital income about 1/3 of GDP and capital investment expenditures about 1/6 of GDP, so that taxable capital income is about 1/6 of GDP. Over the ten-year period ending in 2005, Federal government purchases of goods and services were about 6.5% of GDP-an amount that could be financed by a capital income tax rate of 39%. While some may regard this value of the capital income tax rate as somewhat high, it is important to note that the labor income tax rate would be zero and that capital expenditures would be immediately expensed.
